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Abstract
L6pez-Acevedo  investigates  the effects  of technology on  productivity  and worker wages.  The author  finds  that
the employment and wages of differently  skilled Mexican  skilled  labor increases  after technology  adoption.  And
manufacturing workers  using firm panel data from  wages  of both skilled and  semi-skilled workers  exhibit
1992-99.  She analyzes  the relationship  between  markedly  increased growth rates compared with the
technology  and skill demand.  Findings support the skill-  growth  rate  of low-skilled workers.  The results show that
biased technical change hypothesis.  She then examines  investment  in human  capital improves technology-driven
the temporal relationship  of technology  adoption to firm  productivity gains.
This paper-a product of the Latin America  and the Caribbean  Region,  Poverty  Reduction and Economic  Management
Sector  Unit-is part of a larger  effort in the region  to reduce  poverty  and  inequality  through human capital  investment.
Copies of the paper  are available  free from the World Bank,  1818  H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact
Michael Geller, room 14-046, telephone 202-458-5155,  fax 202-522-2  I1, email address mgellerQu worldbank.org.  Policy
Research  Working  Papers  are  also posted  on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The author  may  be  contacted  at
gacevedo(a worldbank.org.  February  2002.  (22 pages)
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papers carrv the niames of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper are enttirely those of the authors. They do not niecessarily represent the view of the  World Bank,  its Executive Directors, or the
countries thew'  representt.
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' This research was completed  as part of the "Mexico  - Technology Wages  and Employment"  study at the World
Bank.  We  are grateful  to  the  INEGI for  providing us  with  the  data.  Joseph  S. Shapiro  and Erica  Soler provided
valuable research and editorial support.1. Introduction
In the  mid-1980s,  Mexico  began  a process  of structural  reform that fundamentally  changed  the
economic  environment  facing  productive  enterprises.  Liberalization  began  in  1984  and
accelerated  when Mexico joined the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  in  1986. In  1989,
the  government  began  radical  policy  reforms  to  reduce  government  regulation  and  liberalize
trade.  The  adoption of the North  American  Free Trade  Agreement with the U.S.  and Canada  in
1994  intensified  liberalization.  These  reforms  replaced  quotas  with  smaller  tariffs,  eliminated
price  ceilings  and floors, simplified trade regulation,  eased foreign direct  investment restriction,
and privatized state-owned enterprises.
Because  of this  international  openness,  technology  now  lies  at  the  heart  of Mexican
economic  activity.  Globalization-induced  competition  has  made  firms  increase  the  speed  and
efficiency  of new technology  adoption  (TA).  It has also  inspired firms  to increase  research  and
development  (R&D) budgets (OECD 2000).
However,  liberalization  has  worsened  Mexican  wage  equality  (World  Bank  2000).  The
Gini coefficient,  which measures income inequality and is especially sensitive to changes around
the  population  median,  rose  from  0.47  in  1984  to  0.53  in  1998  (Table  1).  While  the poorest
quintile lost 1.3  percent of its income during this period, the richest decile increased  its wealth by
7.7  percent.  In relative  terms,  all strata  except the richest  lost income during this period (Figure
1).
Table 1. Inequality in Mexico,  Measured  by Gini Coefficient
Year  National  Urban  Rural
1984  0.47  0.44  0.45
1989  0.52  0.50  0.44
1992  0.53  0.50  0.43
1994  0.53  0.51  0.42
1996  0.52  0.49  0.45
1998  0.53  0.495  0.48
SouIrce: Author's  calculations based on ENIGH.
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At the height of liberalization,  Mexico  underwent a severe currency  crisis.  In December
1994, Mexico  sharply devalued the peso causing a deep economic recession.  In  1995,  real gross
domestic product (GDP) fell by 6.2 percent,  demand fell by 14.4 percent,  and investment fell by
43 percent.  This market contraction  shifted trade as  exports increased  by almost 31  percent  and
imports fell by 9 percent. Nevertheless,  a cheap peso bolstered  exports and offered new markets
to firms whose  domestic sales had collapsed.  Domestic  demand quickly recovered,  and by  1997
real GDP had returned to its pre-crisis level.
This  paper  investigates  the  skill-biased  technological  change  (SBTC)  hypothesis  for
Mexico,  using panel data from the National  Survey of Employment,  Salaries,  Technology,  and
Training  (ENESTYC)  and the  Annual  Industry  Survey  (EIA).  The  panel  has observations  for
1992,  1995,  and  1999  (for a description of these  surveys and the panel  see Appendix  A and B,
and for a list of variables Appendix C).
Section 2 reviews  Mexico-specific  circumstances.  Section  3 asks whether  technological
change  is biased towards  particular  skill  groups.  Section  4  analyzes  the relationship  of skilled
labor employment to the use of technology.  Section  5 discusses productivity gains  from TA and
training.  Section 6 presents conclusions.
42. Literature Review
A  key  implication  of technology  diffusion  is  its  impact  on the  labor  market.  Several
studies (Davis and Haltiwanger  1991; Krueger  1993,  and Mincer  1991)  find that technology has
raised the relative demand  for more skilled workers and,  consequently,  reduced the  demand for
manual  labor.  Katz  and  Murphy  (1992)  use  a  basic supply  and demand  approach  to  show that
relative  labor  demand  shifts  come  from  intra-industry  changes  (such  as  factor  non-neutral
technological  change,  changes in prices of non-labor inputs, and outsourcing)  and inter-industry
changes (such as shifts in market-wide product demand, sector differences in factor-neutral  total
factor productivity  (TFP)  growth,  and  trade  shifts that  change  the domestic  share  of output  at
fixed relative wages).  Aw and Batra (1999)  also provide evidence that technology (measured by
R&D  and by  worker training)  has  an impact  on firm  performance  (measured  by wages).  This
finding  coheres  with  the  World  Bank  (1999)  "Mexican  Labor  Markets:  New  Views  on
Integration and Flexibility,"  which relates wages to technology  (measured  in terms of R&D  and
technology  acquisition).
In the  last decade,  Mexican  wage  inequality has increased  sharply.  Three  theories  - the
liberalization hypothesis,  the labor institution hypothesis, and the SBTC hypothesis - can explain
this increase  in earnings inequality in Mexico.  The liberalization hypothesis argues that reduced
trade  barriers  put  an  economy  under  competitive  pressure  to  specialize  along  its  lines  of
comparative  advantage.  A  developed  country  with  high  levels  of human  capital  will  shift to
advanced  industry  and  services  as  low-skilled  industries  feel  competition  from  countries  with
abundant low-wage workers.
In  a  test  of liberalization  theory,  Hanson  and  Harrison  (1995)  examine  the  impact  of
Mexican  trade  reform on wage  structure  using  firm-level  data.  They  test whether  trade  reform
shifted  employment  toward  skilled  labor-intensive  industries  (the  Stolper-Samuelson-Type
[SST]  effect).  They conclude  that changes within industries and firms caused the wage  gap, and
2  See,  for example,  the  "Symposium  on  Wage  Inequality"  (1997)  and  the  "Symposium  on How  International
Exchange,  Technology and Institutions Affect Workers"  (1997).
5that the SST effect provides a poor explanation.  Thus the increase  in wage inequality was due to
other factors. Burfisher and others (1993) also examine the SST effect under NAFTA.
However,  the  liberalization  hypothesis  seems  ill-fitted  to  the  Mexican  experience.
Mexico  began  lowering  trade  barriers  after  1984,  particularly  for  American  and  Canadian
commerce, whose share of merchandise  imports from Mexico increased from 68 percent in 1985
to 78 percent  in  1996.  Since Mexico  has an abundant  supply of low skilled labor relative  to its
northern neighbors,  the liberalization  hypothesis predicts that lowered trade barriers would raise
both the  wages  and the demand  for unskilled  labor in Mexico.  However,  as trade  barriers  fell,
low-skilled  labor in Mexico experienced  a real wage decrease while skilled labor had a real wage
increase, resulting in worsened wage inequality.
The trade theory can be adjusted to fit Mexico better:  while trade liberalization  pushes  a
country  towards  its  comparative  advantage,  it  also  facilitates  the  transfer  of  ideas  and
technology.  This  seems  to  provide  a  better  explanation  of earnings  inequality.  Feenstra  and
Hanson (1996)  put  forward a variant of the  liberalization  hypothesis  that  involves  outsourcing
whereby  multinational  enterprises  in  the  developed  country  relocate  their  less  skill-intensive
activities to the less skill-abundant developed  countries.  However, what is referred to as a low-
skill activity in the United States may be a high-skill  activity in Mexico, which could explain the
similarity in earnings inequality between the two countries.
The institutional hypothesis considers  broad changes  such as minimum wage  reductions
and weakened  trade unions.  A  binding  minimum  wage  truncates  the  lower  end  of the  wage
distribution.  As  the  real  minimum  wage  decreases  due to inflation,  its  effect  on industry  also
decreases.  This  translates  into  increased  wage  and earnings  dispersion.  Since  the  early  1980s,
institutional  developments  have  exerted  insignificant  influence  on  earnings  distribution.  The
distribution of real wages,  for example, reveals little distortion due to the minimum wage, which
suggests  that the minimum wage is  low enough to affect industry  minimally.  Similarly,  union
wages in Mexico  are similar to nonunion wages, controlling for education differences.  This data
suggests that unions have little or no impact on earnings.  Although we cannot entirely reject the
6institutional hypothesis,  it does not appear to be the principal explanation  for Mexican  earnings
inequality.
The SBTC hypothesis links earnings inequality to technology that raises relative demand
for skilled labor.  Cragg  and Epelbaum  (1996)  find that,  given different labor supply elasticities,
the primary  source of Mexican  wage  inequality  is a skill-biased  demand  shift rather than skill-
uniform demand growth.  Meza (1999) also investigates the Mexican labor market, and finds that
intra-industry  demand  shifts  toward  a more  educated  labor force  explain  unskilled  labor wage
decreases  better  than  interindustry  demand  shifts.  The  World  Bank  (2000)  also  shows  that
demand  increases  for  a  more  educated  labor  force  within  the  economic  sectors  explain  the
increase  in  their  premium  when  compared  to  the  demand  shifts  for  less  educated  workers
between economic  sectors.  Acosta and Montes  (2001)  show that there is a constant increase  on
skill  premia during the  1987-1993  period,  but there is a deceleration during the  1994-99 period
and  a  decline  after  1997.  These  authors  contend  that  the  former  may  be  caused  by  between
industry differences.
Batra  and Tan  (1997)  study  the  SBTC  hypothesis  as  a  plausible  explanation  of wage
inequality  using  firm-level  data  for  Colombia,  Mexico,  and  Taiwan  (China).  They  find  that
technology's  impact  on wages is greatest  for skilled workers  and lowest  for unskilled  workers,
thereby  supporting  the  SBTC  hypothesis.  In  this  hypothesis,  skilled  workers  become  more
efficient in jobs traditionally performed by unskilled workers (Johnson 1997).
3. Technology's  influence  on wages  and employment
To determine  whether the technology of Mexican firms influences their skill demand, we
estimate determinants  of each skill group's  share of total wages.  In this fixed-effects  model,  we
use a modified first-differencing  to eliminate firm-specific  error.  For a cost minimizing firm, the
following equation models technology's  influence on wages:
Wii, =  AS  In VA4j,  + 82 In K;, + ,63 In Rj, + ,B4 InTFPi, + ,B5 InUR, + Zi, (1)
where:
7Wi,  =  W',  - Wj, or the wages of firm i at time t minus the average wages of firm i over
all time periods;
W,i  = the wage share of skill-groupj in the total wages of firm i;
VA  = value-added  (calculated with INEGI's methodology,  i.e.  the difference  between
the value of the production of the firm and its expenditure  in materials,  water,
energy and electricity) in real  1997 pesos;
K  = capital assets not deflated;3
R  = the relative wage of skilled workers in relation to unskilled workers;
TFP  = total factor productivity,  a measure of technological change;
UR  = the unemployment rate, included as a control for macroeconomic  shocks,  and
E  = the normal regression error.
A positive ,6 parameter in equation (1)  indicates that growing industries are more  likely
to increase the wages of skill groupj. A positive P2 parameter indicates that capital and skills are
complementary  inputs  in the production  process;  a negative parameter  indicates that capital  and
skills are substitutes.  The /3 parameter indicates  how changes in relative  wages affect  the wages
of skill group s. We expect this parameter to be negative,  since a rise in the relative  wages of one
skill  group  leads  a  cost-minimizing  employer  to  substitute  towards  other  groups.  The  34
parameter  of the  TFP shows the  extent to which  technological  change  is skill-biased.  If TFP is
skill-neutral,  it should not impact skill mix.  A positive  /4  parameter  implies  that technological
change  is  skill-using  or  skill-biased,  while  a  negative  64  indicates  that  technology  is  skill-
replacing.  Finally,  /85 will indicate  us how the employment of the different  skill groups varies as
unemployment changes.
We estimate TFP as the residual in a production  function. The specification of the Cobb-
Douglas production function is:
ln(VA),t  = ,8jln(K)j, + fl21n(L)j, +  eit  (2)
where:
VA  = value-added,  in real  1997 Mexican pesos;
K  = fixed capital assets, not deflated;
L  = labor inputs, total hours worked per annum;
= the normal regression error;
i  = the individual plant being analyzed,  and
3No  deflator  is available  for fixed  assets,  due  to  this  we  assume  that the  flow  of capital  services  is adequately
reflected in its book value.
8t  = the time period.
We  estimate  equation  (1)  for  1992-99  manufacturing  firms  panel  using  a  fixed-effects
model. Tables 2 and 3 give separate results for wages  and employment shares of skill groups,  so
we can use both to measure skill demand.
Table 2. Wage Determinants, by Employee  Skill  Group
Dependent variable:  Highly  skilled  Semi-skilled  Low skilled
Share of wages  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.
Value-added  -0.0647  **  -4.161  0.0281  **  1.966  0.0365  **  3.241
Capital assets  0.0479  **  5.794  -0.0401  **  -5.270  -0.0078  -1.301
Wage ratio s/us  0.0082  **  2.061  0.1204  **  32.757  -0.1286  **  -44.456
TFP  0.0232  **  3.864  -0.0148  **  -2.681  -0.0084  *  -1.926
Unemployment rate  -0.0225  **  -2.636  0.0146  *  1.850  0.0080  1.285
Overall R2 0.0315  0.4550  |  0.5508
*  Significant  at 10% level; **  Significant at 5% level.
Notes: I. Number of observations =  1  ,185.
2. Regressions included indicator variables  for 9 manufacturing divisions.
3.  Share of wages is the share of the firm's total  wages paid to workers  of a particular skill  level.
Table 3.  Employment Determinants, by Employee  Skill  Group
Dependent variable:  Highly Skilled  Semi-skilled  Low skilled
Share of Employment  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.  Coeff.  t-Stat.
All Emvlovees
Value-added  -0.8129  **  -2.487  1.1669  0.687  -0.3552  -0.210
Capital assets  0.7198  **  4.140  -1.1942  -1.321  0.4785  0.531
Wage ratio s/us  0.0704  0.837  14.9349  **  34.190  -15.0057  **  -34.455
TFP  0.3072  **  2.428  -0.5728  -0.871  0.2653  0.404
Unemployment rate  -0.0458  -0.255  3.3348  **  3.566  -3.2807  **  -3.518
Overall R2 0.0037  0.5869  0.5887
Male Employees
Value-added  -0.0076  *  -1.895  0.0412  *  1.735  -0.0210  -0.825
Capital assets  0.0077  **  2.826  -0.0277  *  -1.714  0.0088  0.510
Wage ratio s/us  0.0007  0.671  0.1335  **  20.184  -0.1392  **  -19.679
TFP  0.0042  **  2.946  -0.0216  **  -2.527  0.0105  1.147
Unemployment  rate  0.0008  0.084  0.0447  0.819  -0.0713  -1.221
Overall R 2 0.0081  0.4319  0.3658
Female Employees
Value-added  -0.0013  -1.193  -0.0340  **  -2.045  0.0226  1.499
Capital assets  0.0011  1.541  0.0252  **  2.234  -0.0151  -1.480
Wage ratio s/us  0.0003  1.051  0.0275  **  5.945  -0.0228  **  -5.435
TFP  0.0007  *  1.831  0.0094  1.565  -0.0032  -0.588
Unemployment rate  -0.0022  -0.900  0.0341  0.894  -0.0061  -0.175
Overall R2 0.0145  0.0057  |  0.0353
*  Significant  at  10% level; **  Significant at 5% level.
Notes:  I. Number of observations=  1,185.
2. Regressions  included indicator variables for 9 manufacturing divisions.
3. Share of employment  is  the share of the fimi's total employment held by workers  of a particular skill level.
The effects of output growth vary between skill groups.  It appears that growing firms are
less likely to hire highly  skilled male employees.  In contrast,  for the semi-skilled  group and the
9low  skilled  group,  the value-added  paramneters  are  positive  and  significant  in the wage  share
estimation  and  insignificant  in  the  employment  share  specification  for  all  workers.  With
reference to gender,  the value-added  parameter is positive for the semi-skilled male workers and
negative  for the  semi-skilled  female  workers, this suggests that growing firms  tend to  increase
male rather than female production workers.
It is  interesting  to  note  that the  unemployment  control  is positive  for the  semi-skilled
group and negative  or neutral  for the highly skilled  and low-skilled  groups.  This  suggests that
employers increase the relative  share of production workers as overall unemployment rises.
We find that capital and highly skilled workers are complements  while capital  and semi-
skilled workers  are substitutes.  This result is consistent with Tan (2000).  Also, capital  and semi-
skilled male production workers are substitutes while capital  and semi-skilled female production
workers are complements.
Finally,  technology is biased toward the use of highly skilled workers.  This implies  that
technology  is  skill-using  for  highly  skilled  workers  but  skill-replacing  for  semi-skilled  and
unskilled  workers.  Furthermore,  technical  change  is  skill-using  for  male  and  female  highly
skilled  workers  and  skill-replacing  for  the semi-skilled  male  production  workers.  Tan  (2000)
finds that, in Malaysia,  technical  change is skill-using only for male highly skilled workers.
4. Time of benefit from technology
Probit models of technology adoption are informative  but ill-suited to dynamic processes
(L6pez-Acevedo  2001).  To analyze  the temporal relationship  of labor  demand  and TA,  we use
event  analysis.  As  Tan  (2000)  suggests,  comparing  the  period  of TA  to  skill-mix  changes  in
previous  and  consecutive  time  periods  facilitates  effective  event  analysis.  The  variable  r
represents the time period relative to TA; the period of adoption  is  r = 0 , the period  preceding
adoption is r= -1, and the period following adoption is r= 1. Since companies adopt technology
at different times, the period in which  r = 0 differs between  firms, Also, we define that  T  = 0  in
all periods for a firm that never adopts technology.  Since we only have point data for 1992,  1995,
and  1999,  rranges from -2 to 2. Using information  on rfrom all firms that adopt technology,  we
10estimate  the  v-profile of skill  shares,  or the  relationship  of when  a  firm hires  skilled  labor to
when it adopts technology.  We  measure  the  v-profile relative to  r  = 0 to allow comparison with
firms that adopted technology in the same period, and with firms that never adopted technology.
We  want to  know  how employers  vary  skill-mix  in  the  years preceding  and  following
TA.  A regression model relating skill shares to  rmay be written as follows:
SiJt =l+  ,loAXt+  + fl2iZy 1 T  + /337'  +,6 4lnUR + sit  (3)
where:
Sjjt  = the share of workers of skill groupj in firm i during period t;
X  = a vector of firm and industry characteristics;
Z  = a vector of dummy variables for each  rbetween -2 and +2;
T,  =  a time trend term, and
UR  = the unemployment rate, included as a control for macroeconomic  changes.
Here,  the  A2  coefficients  trace  the  v-profile  of skill  share j  relative  to  r =  0.  We  use
models of similar specification to examine how productivity and wages vary with r.
Table  4  reports  the  estimated  coefficients  of  r, in  relation  to  r =  0. These  v-profiles
appear  graphically  in  Figures  2  through  8. We  fit these  graphs with  cubic  spline  to show the
underlying  trends in these  variables  over  -r  more  effectively.  In essence, they relate firm  hiring
patterns to TA timing.
Table 4. Estimated  Coefficients of rfor Skill Shares, Productivity and Wages of TA Firms
Skill  Shares  Wages by  Skill Groun
r  Highly skilled  semiskilledd  Unskilled  Productivity  Highly skilled  Skilled and  Unskilled
-2  -0.7193  *  -2.8499  3.8857  -1.0721  **  -1.3990  **  -1.1136**  -0.9067**
-1  -0.5144  *  -7.6369**  9.0491**  -0.5273  **  -0.7277  **  -0.7224**  -0.3480**
0
1  0.2992  *  3.2059**  -3.0640**  0.5745  **  0.7215  **  0.6064**  0.5846**
2  0.5262  **  3.0331**  -4.5258**  1.0297  **  1.4301  **  1.1697**  1.1401**
* Significant at 10% level; **  Significant at 5%  level.
Notes: Regressions  included  dummy variables for 9 manufacturing  divisions,  indicators for small,  medium and large firms, dummy variables  for
foreign  firms and joint-ventures, and  a control for macroeconomic  changes.















SHARE  OF UNSKILLED  WORKERS AND ADOPTIONFigure  2  and  Table  4 show  that prior  to TA,  the share  of highly  skilled  workers  changes  little
relative  to the time of TA.  The share of highly skilled workers among  total firm  employment is
fairly small. Although we observe an increase in the number of highly skilled workers hired after
TA, the increase  is also  small relative  to the total number of workers  in the firm. Figure 3 shows
that the share  of skilled and semi-skilled  production workers  increases  before and after TA.  By
the second period after TA, the share of skilled and semi-skilled workers has risen considerably.
Figure  4 shows that the share of less-skilled  workers is actually larger before TA, but falls post-
adoption.
The  r-profile  for productivity  appears  in  Figure 5. Productivity  of technology  firms is
relatively low before TA. But after TA, productivity of technology firms increases.  Although the
y-axis  of the  graph  represents  the  log of productivity,  the scale  is linear  and not  logarithmic;
hence,  the productivity  of technology  firms  increases  both before  and  after TA.  However,  one
period after TA, the rate of productivity growth jumps.
Figure 5. Productivity Pre- and Post-TA
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PRODUCTIVITY  AND ADOPTION
Technology  increases  firm  productivity  and  consequently  firm  profits.  But  how  do
worker  wage  changes  relate  to  firm  profit  increases?  To  address  this  question,  we  estimate
separate equations for each skill group, with the dependent variable being the logarithm of wages
of the skill group. The resulting  r-profiles of three skill groups - highly skilled, semi-skilled,  and














UNSKILLED WORKERS  WAGES  AND ADOPTIONWages show similar trends to productivity,  as it appears  that employers  share productivity  gains
from technology  with all  skills of employees.  However,  skilled employees  receive  significantly
more benefit than unskilled employees.  Wages of all skills of employees begin rising two periods
before  TA, and continue rising until two periods after  TA.  Furthermnore,  the growth rates of the
wages of all skill groups jump after TA.
5. Technology  Adoption  and Productivity Growth
As Tan (2000) argues,  a production  function including variables  for technology type and
experience with technology is the best approach  for investigating formnally the productivity gains
from  introduction  of new  technology.  The  production  function  also  lets  us test  whether  the
benefits of experience with technology increase when combined with employee training:
In(VA),,  =  ,  ln(K,, )  + f8 2 ln(L,, ) + /3  3X1TAj,  + Al  + A  4  +  (4)
where:
VA  =VA,  - VA,,  or the difference  of VA  at time t and the average of VA  at all times
for firm i.
VA  = value-added  (calculated with INEGI's methodology,  i.e. the difference  between
the value of the production of the firm and its expenditure  in materials,  water,
energy and electricity)  in real  1997 pesos;
K  = capital assets (not deflated);4
L  = labor input;
Yj TA  = a vector of interactive indicator variables for thej types of technology adopted;5
Yr  y  = a vector of indicator variables for technology experience;
Z  = a vector of firm and industry characteristics;
i  = firm under analysis;
t  = time period;
.6  = normal regression error.
To  find  the  value-added  of  training  when  new  technology  is  adopted,  we  include
interaction  terms  for  technology  type  and  training.  Robust  results  in  Table  5  show  that
4No  deflator  is  available  for  fixed assets,  due  to this  we  assume  that  the  flow  of capital  services  is  adequately
reflected  in its book value.
5 This  is  a dummy variable  that gets assigned  a "I"  if the  firm adopts new  technology  and provides  training,  an a
"O"  otherwise.
15combining training with TA increases productivity  in three of the four categories of technology.
On  average,  when  training  increases  technology's  productivity  the  benefit  is  more  than  six
percent.  These results indicate the  importance  of complementary  investments in worker training
to realize the productivity potential  of technology.  Training  has the greatest effect when a firm
adopts machinery tools, and the least effect when a firm adopts robots.
Table 5. The value-added  of training with technology
Dependent variable:  1992-1999
Log(value-added)  Coeff.  t-Stat.
Production Function
Constant  9.1594  **  27.833
Log(capital)  0.0948  **  3.843
Log(total hours worked)  0.1378  **  5.224
Types of TA and Training
Automatic equipment  0.0635  *  1.742
Machinery tools  0.0789  **  2.593
Computerized  machinery  0.0671  *  1.684
Robots  -0.0041  0.976
TA Experience
1  -0.1029  **  -3.864
2  ___  _  -0.0081  0.817
Number of obs.  2,733
Overall R 2 0.4143
' Significant at 10% level; **  Significant at 5%  level.
Note: Regressions  included dummy variables for 9 manufacturing divisions,  foreign
firms and joint-ventures.
6. Conclusions
This paper attempts to understand how TA affects demand for highly skilled, skilled and
semi-skilled,  and unskilled  workers.  Both in terms  of wages  and employment,  with TA  firms
tend to hire more high skilled workers and pay them better. We also analyze the relative times of
TA and demand shifts for a given firm. We find that demand for highly skilled workers increases
after  the  adoption  of technology,  but not  before.  By the  second  period  after  TA,  demand  for
highly skilled, skilled, and semi-skilled workers has risen notably, while the share of employees
made  up of unskilled  workers tends to diminish after the adoption of technology.  Additionally,
training and increases in human capital magnify technology-driven  productivity gains.
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17APPENDIX  A
INEGI  has  compiled  the  National  Survey  of Employment,  Salaries,  Technology,  and
Training (ENESTYC).  The Ministry of Labor co-designed the questionnaire, which gathered rich
information on training, technology, wages, employment, forms of labor contracting, and internal
plant  organization  of Mexican  manufacturing  firms.  The  government  conducted  the  survey  in
1992,  1995,  and 1999, but its questions  on technology ask whether  the firm adopted technology
in the periods  1989-1992,  1994-1995,  or  1997-1999,  respectively.  Our references  to the time  of
technology adoption mention only the final year of the period (e.g.  1992 rather than 1989-1992).
Data from the  1992 survey includes  5,071  firms, from the 1995  survey includes 5,242 firms, and
from the  1999 survey includes 7,429 firms.
A valuable feature of ENESTYC  is that it allows us to identify the  same firm in 1992,
1995,  and  1999. Nonetheless,  we should  qualify our estimations with survivor bias.  Only firms
that exist in all three years  can be  included in the panel database.  As Audretsch  (1995)  shows,
survival  likelihood  is strikingly  low for small  and new enterprises  and increases  with firm  size
and age.  Thus, the panel includes an unrepresentatively  high number of large and mature firms.
While random observation selection should not cause bias in our resulting estimations,  surviving
firms are not randomly selected. Darwinian selection of extant  firms means that the firms in our
sample tend to be more efficient and have better performance than an average Mexican firm.
Another  advantage  of this  database  is  the  broad  spectrum  of firm  sizes  included  by
industry,  shown  in tables  B.1-B.3.  The  rich information  available  in ENESTYC  allows  us  to
distinguish technology diffusion policies for firms of different size and character.
INEGI  also  conducts  the  Annual  Industrial  Survey  (EIA).  The  survey  covers  6,500
manufacturing  plants  throughout  Mexico  that  account  for  80  percent  of production  in  each
industry group.  Since the  survey attempts to cover the majority of manufacturing  production but
not a majority of plants in all categories, our sample includes all large plants and most medium-
sized scale plants, but few small-scale plants and very few microenterpise  plants.
18We link the ENESTYC  panels to firms  in the EIA.  This allows  us to combine  EIA data
on productivity,  labor, value-added,  and capital with ENESTYC variables for the plants common
to  both  surveys.  The  panels  also  include  some  regional  variables  using  the  Indicators  of
Scientific  and  Technology  Activity  in  Mexico  from  the  National  Council  of  Science  and
Technology (CONACYT).  A description of the variables in the panels  appears in the Appendix.
The  1992-95  panel  has 3,293  firms,  the  1995-99  panel  has  1,717 firms,  and the  1992-99  panel
has  1,066 firms.
The  information  on  individual  establishments  that  INEGI  gathers  through  its
questionnaires  (which law requires firms to answer)  is legally confidential,  and INEGI is unable
to  give  the  raw  data  to outside  agencies.  Therefore,  we  followed  an  established  procedure  in
which most data analysis  was done in [NEGI's  Aguascalientes  headquarters  with the support of
INEGI  personnel.  Nevertheless,  the reader should bear  in mind the limitations  on data analysis
imposed by this institutional arrangement.
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Table B.1. Manufacturing Firms in the 1992-1995  Panel by Industry and Size
Size
Division  All  Large  Medium  Small  Micro
Total  3,293  352  576  1,099  1,266
Food, beverage andtobacco  669  105  114  163  287
Textiles, clothing, leather  551  36  93  231  191
Wood and woodproducts  149  28  42  61  18
Paper and paper products  219  16  31  103  69
Chemical products  494  40  94  185  175
Non-metallic  minerals  161  45  31  25  60
Basic metal industries  102  13  13  39  37
Metal products, machinery  897  65  147  272  413
Other manufacturing industries  51  4  11  20  16
Source: 1992-95  ENESTYC Panel.
Table B.2.  Manufacturing Firms in the 1995-1999 Panel by Industry and Size
Size
Division  All  Large  Medium  Small  Micro
Total  1,717  829  737  145  6
Food, beverage and tobacco  372  232  114  26
Textiles,  clothing, leather  273  133  113  23  4
Wood and wood products  57  19  32  6
Paper and paper products  146  54  83  9
Chemical products  306  126  153  26  1
Non-metallic  minerals  75  32  33  10
Basic metal industries  41  21  15  5
Metal products, machinery  419  198  183  37  1
Other manufacturing industries  28  14  11  3
Source: 1995-99 ENESTYC  Panel.
Table B.3. Manufacturing Firms in the 1992-1999 Panel by Industry and Size
Size
Division  All  Large  Medium  Small  Micro
Total  1,066  554  439  72  1
Food, beverage and tobacco  227  154  63  10
Textiles,  clothing, leather  162  70  80  12
Wood and wood products  36  9  19  8
Paper and paper products  95  36  52  7
Chemical products  190  86  87  16  1
Non-metallic minerals  46  34  10  2
Basic  metal industries  36  18  18
Metal products, machinery  257  138  102  17
Other manufacturing  industries  17  9  8
Source: 1992-99 ENESTYC Panel.
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1992-99 Panel Variables Description
Variable  Description  Value
From the ENVESTYC
Firm size according to the number of workers:
Micro  I - 15  Dummy for each size
Firm size  Small  16 - 100  1= if the firm belongs to a certain size
Medium  101  -250  0= otherwise.
Large  250 -more  _.  _
Manufacturing  industries:
1) Food, beverages,  and tobacco
2) Textiles,  clothing,  and leather
3)  Wood and wood Droducts  Dummy for  each industrv
Division  4) Paper,  paper products, printing,  and publishing  I  m  if the  firm belongs to a certain industry
5)  Chemicals, oil derivatives,  and coal  0= otherxvise.
6)  Non-metallic  mineral products
7) Basic  metallic  industries
8)  Metallic  products. machiniery,  and equipment
9) Other manufacturing  industries
Total  workers  Number of workers  in the firm.  Continuous
Regions:  Dummies
Includes the  states of Baja California, Baja
California  Sur, Coahuila,  Chihuahua. Durango,  I= if the firm  is located  in the North,
Nuevo Le6n,  Sinaloa.  Sonora, Tamaulipas, and  0= otherwise.
Zacatecas.
Includes the states of  Aguascalientes,  Colima,
Center  Guanajuato.  Hidalgo.  Jalisco,  Mexico.  1= if the firm is located  in the Center.
C  Michoacan,  Morelos,  Nayarit,  Puebla.  Queretaro.  0= otherwise.
San Luis Potosi,  and Tlaxcala.  _  __
Includes the states of Campeche,  Chiapas,  1- if the firm is located  in the South,
South  Guerrero, Oaxaca,  Quintana  Roo,  Tabasco.  0= otherwise.
Veracruz,  and Yucatan.
D  .strito  Federal  - 1= if the firm is located in the Capital,
Capitat  Distrito IFederal0=ohrie Capital  1  i  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~0=  otherwise.
Years  Firm's age.  Continuous
Dummy
Technology  adoption  Adoption of new technology.  I= if the firm adopts new technology.
_.  _  __  0= otherwise.
Highly skilled workers  Number of executives and managers  in the tirm.  Continuous
Semi-skilled workers  Number of production workers  in the firm.  Continuous
Unskilled workers  Number of general workers  in the firm.  Continuous
Share of highly skilled  Share of highly skilled  workers from the total of  Ranks between 0-100
workers  workers in the firm.
Share of semi-skilled  Share of semi-skilled  workers from the total of  Ranks between  0-100
workers  workers in the lirm.
Share of unskilled  Share of unskilled  workers from the total of  Ranks between  0-100
workers  workers in the firm.
New hires  New hires.  Continuous
Laidoffs  Dismissals.  Continuous
Net  employment  New hires less dismissals.  Continuous
Total wages  Total wages  in  real pesos paid  in the firm.  Continuous  __  -
Highlv  skilled  wages  Total wages  in real pesos paid to  the highly  Continuous
skilled workers  in the firm.  _-
Semi-skilled  wages  Total wages  in real  pesos paid  to the semi-skilled  Continuous
workers  in the firm.
21Unskilled wages  Total wages in real pesos paid to the unskilled  Continuous
workers  in the firm.
Share of highly skilled  Share of the highly  skilled  workers wages from  Ranks between 0-100
wages  the firm's total wages.
Share of semi-skilled  Share of the semi-skilled  workers wages from the  Ranks between 0-100
wages  firm's total wages.
Share of unskilled  Share of the unskilled workers wages from the  Ranks between 0-100
wages  firm's total wages.
Dummy
Maquila  Firms dedicated to maquila activities.  I= if maquila
O= otherwise.
Productivity  Firm's productivity  measured  as output per  Continuous
worker.
From the EIA
Capital assets  Firm's capital:  fixed assets, not deflated.  Continuous
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